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Abstract 
 
 
The introduction of the Modified Budgeting System (MBS) as one of the New Public 
Financial Management (NPFM) tools to bring the efficiency of private sector into Malaysian 
government organisations had its implication on these organisations' performance 
measurement systems. Therefore, by obtaining perceptions of the senior managers in the 
civil services who experienced the reform, this study examines the impact of the Modified 
Budgeting System (MBS) had on performance measurement practice in Malaysian central 
government organisations.  Specifically, the respondents were asked about the impact of the 
MBS on improving output based performance measurement, linkage between inputs and 
outputs, and developing own output measures. This study also examines who are the 
stakeholders consulted to develop performance measures and the level of importance that 
civil service’ managers attach to different types of performance indicators   covering both 
financial and non financial indicators. The study found that generally the respondents agreed 
that the MBS had improved performance measurement in their organisations, and civil 
service managers attached more importance on customer related measures than efficiency 
indicators. Despite of these, weaknesses in implementation was mainly related to resistance 
to change by managers, thus, this might impede the effective development of the 
performance measures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing importance of performance measurement in public sector for the past 
two decades was the results of the call for greater accountability and performance in public 
sector organisations (Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2000; Hyndman and Eden, 2001). 
Introducing private sector management techniques into public sector spheres was not unique 
to government in developed countries. Various governments in developing countries made 
similar attempts to improve their service delivery systems (Minogue et al., 1998; Polidano, 
1999; Manning, 2001). One means of achieving this is through the change of performance 
measurement system to capture result based information for planning, control, decision 
making and tightening up accountability (Hyndman and Eden, 2002).   
In Malaysian central government, the Modified Budgeting System (MBS) is viewed as 
a significant attempt to introduce output and results based performance measurement system. 
This specifically matches the requirement of the reform architects’ aim to make civil 
servants accountable for productivity in terms of costs and results (Abdul Hamid, 1995). 
With its ‘Lets managers manage’ principle and customer orientation, each spending 
organisation was required to set output-based performance target indicators included in the 
Programme Agreement as a performance contract with the Treasury (Malaysian Treasury, 
1994).   
Although a significant amount of research on the impact of the New Public 
Management on performance measurement in governments in developed countries during 
the 1990s, similar empirical studies in government of emerging economies are still limited. 
Therefore, the principal aim of this study is to provide useful insights into the impact of the 
Modified Budgeting System (MBS) had on shifting traditional mainly input based 
performance measurement system to the NPM-like results based performance measurement 
in Malaysian central government organisations.  This was addressed by  obtaining 
perceptions of the senior managers in the Central Government Organisations on the overall 
impact of the MBS on improving output based performance measurement, linkage between 
inputs and outputs, and developing own output measures. In addition, this study also 
examines who are the stakeholders consulted to develop performance measures and the level 
of importance that civil service managers attached to different types of output based 
performance indicators. Inspired by the findings of the previous studies (see for example, 
Pendlbury et. al., 1994; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Hyndman and Eden, 2001), that their 
dominant stakeholders have significantly influenced importance of performance measures 
attached by civil service managers working in the organisations. As the MBS's emphases on 
focusing to meet customer needs, it would have been expected that civil service managers 
should give more importance to customer based performance indicator over other indicators. 
Therefore, the paper is organised as follows. In the following section, a detailed 
discussion on literature relating to performance measurement in public sector world wide 
will be given. Then, the role of the MBS to introduce result based performance indicators 
will be discussed. Following the description of research methodology, the results and 
analysis of questionnaire and interview surveys are provided. The final section of this paper 
presents some conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
With greater autonomy to civil servants to manage, the increased focus on the 
customer of the services, the increased use of competition and contractual relationships 
within the public sector organisations have led to a growth in the use of performance 
measures (Pallot, 1999; Pollitt and Bouckeart, 2000; Sanderson, 2001). Specifically, the 
greater use of performance indicators in the civil services as they have become tools for 
control by central government over decentralised agencies (Sanderson, 2001). In the context 
of New Public Management (NPM), the importance of performance indicators is to enhance 
the accountability of devolved public sector organisations, in that it emphasises output and 
results-based performance measures (Likierman, 1993; Smith, 1993; Hood, 1995; Sanderson, 
2001). The previous emphasis was based on compliance with laws, rules and regulations 
focusing on inputs and process orientation (Romzek, 2000). With contemporary government 
reforms seek to shift the emphasis of performance measurement in public services from 
process to output and outcomes, examples of results-oriented indicators included efficiency 
indicators (measures of the input/output relationship – i.e. cost per unit of output), 
effectiveness indicators were measures of the degree of achievement of the programme’s 
objective, and cost effectiveness indicators measured unit cost of outcome (Alford and Baird, 
1997).  
With the shift towards results based accountability in public sector, performance 
measurement should also promote improvement in performance. Hyndman and Eden (2001) 
found, from their study of nine Executive Agencies in Northern Ireland, that the objectives of 
improving management and providing greater accountability were equally important. They 
reported the use of targets was viewed as extremely valuable in communicating to 
individuals, eliciting commitment to the organisational goals, and in improving the focus of 
individual teams within the organisation. The Chief Executives of these agencies identified a 
natural link between improving management and greater accountability. Nevertheless, 
Halachmi (2002) suggested there is a need for two separate schemes of performance 
measures, one to serve the purposes of accountability, and the other to serve greater 
performance. She argued that performance measures to improve accountability discourage 
managers of public services from deviating from approved plans, at the expense of the public 
interest. The use of performance measurement as a form of control may prevent managers 
from learning. An imposed system of accountability discourages managers from confronting 
failure and learning from it (Sinclair, 1995).  As argued by Smith (1993), excessive use of 
output-based performance indicators might lead to dysfunctional behaviour in public sector 
management. 
Drawing from stakeholder perspectives, performance measurement system should 
enable government organisations to address the concerns and needs of multiple stakeholders 
(Modell, 2003; Pollanen, 2005). The unique development of performance measurement 
initiatives in public sector organisations is that performance measures are imposed by the 
central agencies as part of the accountability requirements rather than developed from 
competitive pressure to perform. Therefore, the issue of usefulness of these measures arise. 
Do these measures develop to meet accountability compliance or for performance? Besides 
examining the usage of the relevant measures, previous studies also examined the level of 
importance that managers attach to each type of performance measures (can be financial or 
non-financial measures). Interestingly, as these measures were developed to address the 
interest of different stakeholders, the level of importance that managers to any of the 
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indicators reflects the importance of the stakeholders to the organisations over the others.   
The following empirical studies highlight this tension. 
In the study by Hyndman and Eden (2001), they found the importance of different 
types of targets was being prioritised based on the priority of parent departments. The types 
of these targets were financial targets (i.e. live within budget), volume targets (i.e. number of 
cases handled), efficiency targets (i.e. cost per vehicle tested, cases handled per employee), 
and quality targets (i.e. waiting times). The parent department viewed certain financial 
targets as being essential. The agency would then prioritise the same targets. A similar 
finding was found by Brignall and Modell (2000). They suggested that the interplay of the 
pressures from a government organisation’s major stakeholders (funding authorities, 
professional employees and contracting purchasers of services) should make the 
management prioritise different types of indicators over others (i.e. financial indicators over 
quality indicators). An earlier, similar finding by Carter and Greer (1993, p. 414) was that 
performance indicators became political instruments, mediating the complex relationship 
between the parent ministry and agencies, as they are central for resource allocation to the 
agencies.  In short, as McKevitt and Lawton (1996) indicate, it may be unrealistic to expect 
any system of performance measurement to satisfy the interests of all stakeholders: the 
interests of the more powerful stakeholders are likely to dominate.  It seems to suggest that 
the important performance measures attached by the managers in public sector organisations 
may suggest which different stakeholders are dominant. Clatworthy and Mellett (1997) 
pointed out the difficulty faced by managers in health care to balance two seemingly 
contradictory performance targets for different stakeholders: operational targets (published in 
league tables for customers) and financial targets (published in annual reports for trust 
members). 
THE MODIFIED BUDGETING SYSTEM (MBS) AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT  
The emphasis on result based accountability had become increasingly central to 
Malaysia’s public sector organisations (Shafie, 1996).  For instance, reform initiatives 
introduced by the Malaysian Prime Ministry Department such as  the Productivity 
Improvement Initiative, Total Quality Management (TQM),  and ISO 9000 certification 
programmes should lead the government bodies to set up a comprehensive performance 
measurement system (CPMS) to assist civil servants in achieving operational effectiveness 
and strategic objectives. On top of these developments, the Modified Budgeting System 
(MBS) was seen as an attempt by the Malaysian Treasury to extend the existing 
infrastructure of the performance measurement system to be at par with the New Public 
Management initiatives in many governments in developed nations. 
 In year 1990, as a result of knowledge sharing with the Australian government, the 
MBS was introduced in the pilot organisations (i.e Public Work Department, Ministry of 
Health) to test the new system (Xavier, 1996). In year 1996, after showing positive impact in 
the pilot organisations, the Treasury decided the new budget system to be implemented in all 
central government bodies including Ministries, Departments and Statutory Bodies 
(Malaysian Treasury, 2001).  The MBS reflects the Treasury's approach to address the 
weakness of the existing financial management approaches and procedures such as problems 
of incremental budgeting and gaming was through incorporating the New Public 
Management features. The Malaysian Treasury developed the MBS to be a managerial tool 
for managers and to tighten accountability of civil servants through the performance contract 
mechanism. Both of these dimensions have impact on the development of the performance 
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measurement systems. The idea of the MBS as managerial tool was highlighted by the 
Treasury because of its strategic orientation, customer focus and greater involvement of top 
management in resource allocation.  
Strategic orientation of the MBS should lead the government organisations to reassess 
their programmes and activities to be consistent with organisational objectives, which in turn 
the programme structure must promote greater understanding of relationships between 
outputs and results, and resources allocated. Or else, meaningful performance evaluation is 
difficult to make.  In line with this, for each activity, customers and targets groups need to be 
properly defined and their needs and wants should be identified and updated.  Therefore, the 
government organisations were encouraged  to engage their customers in order to identify 
their needs and wants. In addition, the Treasury expected greater participation of the top 
management of the government organisations to ensure that public resources are allocated 
according to priority areas. Nevertheless, greater involvement of the top management into a 
budgeting process requires a cultural change. Willingness of top management of government 
bodies to comply with the treasury requirements remain to be seen. In the past, lack of top 
management involvement was due to the incremental nature of the budget and lack of 
strategic focus (Commonwealth, 1995).  
The Treasury's attempt in improving result based accountability through the MBS was 
principally implemented with delegation of greater financial autonomy and flexibility from 
the Treasury to government organisations and then on to line managers and in return they 
need to achieve specified performance targets (Malaysian Treasury, 1988). This initiative 
manifested itself in the policy that has become widely known as the ‘Let managers manage’ 
policy.  With delegation of budgetary autonomy to government organisations, the Treasury 
introduced Programme Agreement as performance contract mechanism to enhance the 
accountability of managers in government organisations. At the top management level, the 
Programme Agreement is a performance contract between them and the Treasury. As part of 
the overall NPM initiatives, a contractual approach to performance measurement and 
reporting requirements is argued to be able to strengthen accountability (OECD, 1995). 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the performance contract between the Treasury and 
budget holders at the organisational level could only work if the Treasury were the most 
dominant stakeholder.  Or else, it would promote coercive isomorphism as suggested by the 
NIS theorists. As discussed earlier, government organisations would give preference to the 
performance target that was the focus of the dominant stakeholders. Although the position of 
the Treasury in the hierarchy of dominant stakeholders remains to be investigated, the 
MBS’s focus on customer orientation, strategic focus, freedom to manage and result based 
performance contract show at least the change in focus to serve customers as the main 
stakeholder better. These changes should provide the government organisations opportunities 
to challenge the traditional bureaucracy of obedient to Parent Ministries and elected 
politicians over other stakeholders.  
The Programme Agreement provides details about the activities for which the budget 
allocation to be provided that include objectives of the activities, policy problems, customers 
analysis and amount of resource allocation. More importantly, budget holders should set in 
the Programme Agreement the output based performance targets that cover quantity, quality, 
timeliness, unit costs and outcome targets for each authorised activity (Malaysian Treasury, 
2001, p. 31). Output quantity types are aimed at indicating the expected units of outputs to be 
provided in a given unit of performance measurement, such as the number of outputs per 
worker per day and the number of outputs per month.  Quality of output indicators includes 
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quality surveys, level of customer complaints, level of acceptable errors, and the timeliness 
of services. Although timeliness is argued to be part of the quality indicators, it was 
specifically required for performance measures in the Programme Agreement as probably to 
ensure standardisation of practice across government organisations. Unit cost of output type 
of indicators is aimed at relating cost inputs to output of services.  
 Interestingly, the Treasury also requires government organisations to set outcome 
measures and targets. As it was widely asserted in the literature that outcome indicators are 
difficult to measure (Boston, 1993), the measurement of outcomes as required by the 
Treasury would either lead to mere mimicking or creating greater awareness amongst civil 
servants that they need to think beyond traditional performance parameters. Given the 
requirements of performance information, the MBS is supposed to cause a shift from mainly 
input/ process performance measurement to comprehensive results based performance 
culture emphasising both financial and non financial measures. In other words, government 
organisations should at least consider other non financial performance measures as equally 
important as the traditional performance measures based on budget and expenditure report. 
Hopefully, this would lead to benefits, such as a greater value for money and an improved 
link between the use of financial resources and their respective outputs.   
Besides the above development, another feature of the MBS was Expenditure Target 
(ET) for each authorised activity under every budgeted programme.  The ET was set as the 
budget ceiling, but  the process of setting it was more interesting. The expenditure target 
(ET) is a budget ceiling for an on-going programme. As the Treasury arrives at the ET of an 
on-going programme by adjusting the previous year’s allocation for “one offs” 
(extraordinary and non-recurrent expenditures provided in the previous year), this inherently 
gave signal to the budget holders to spend spree in the year end or else they would face 
budget cut in the subsequent year. Therefore, for managers to balance between developing 
savings, making effort for greater value for money and avoiding budget cut, these posed 
them a difficult challenge to make the MBS a valuable managerial tool.  
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of the MBS had had on performance 
measurement practice of the Malaysian government organisations. Therefore, the following 
pertinent issues were investigated: First, respondents were invited to respond to what extent 
the MBS had improved their organisations' results based performance measurement system, 
the linkage between inputs and outputs, and developing own outputs measures. These issues 
were investigated because the MBS was supposed to improve performance measurement 
system as part of its function as managerial tool and improving accountability. The impact of 
the MBS on overall performance measurement system is expected as the Treasury promoted 
the MBS to be managerial tools and to implement results based performance measures via 
Programme Agreement. Overview on the impact of the MBS had on improving relationship 
between inputs and outputs is essential because information on outputs and outcomes with 
the budget figures will improve performance assessment. Developing own output measures 
is considered as a significant development because managers in the organisations should be 
given the autonomy to select and choose performance measures that reflect their strategic 
and operational priorities, rather than be dictated by central agencies such as the Treasury 
and the Parent Ministries. Developing own output measures would also guarantee that 
performance measures selected are relevant for management's planning and control 
activities.  
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Second, the respondents were asked on who being consulted to select key performance 
indicators used in their organisations. This would help to identify various stakeholders 
involved in the performance measurement process. More importantly, the MBS was 
developed to improve strategic management of government bodies with customer emphasis, 
so, any move towards active role of customers is an indication of effectiveness of the reform 
initiative. Third, the respondents were invited to respond to the level of use and importance 
that they attached to specific financial and non-financial performance measures. With the 
implementation of the MBS, the Treasury required government organisations to establish 
result based performance measures with customer focus as dictated in the Programme 
Agreement.  By asking them these questions, this would identify the relevance of these 
measures to the government organisations and the findings would also enable us to reach 
conclusion who are the important stakeholders of the government organisations. With the 
desire to improve value for money of the government allocation, it would be expected that 
the government organisations would place customers related performance indicators (i.e 
quality of output type) more important over other indicators.   
To achieve the objectives of the study, perceptions of senior government servants from 
the central government organisation were sought using cross sectional survey with two main 
stages of data collection - questionnaire and interview surveys.  The central government 
organisations selected in this study are Ministries, Departments and Statutory Bodies. 
Departments and Statutory Bodies are agencies under Ministries. While departments 
received budget allocation through Parent Ministries, Statutory Bodies are considered to 
have greater autonomy in management and financial matters (Othman, 2001). As suggested 
in the literature (ter Bogt, 1999, p. 335), an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
reforms was considered appropriate because the financial reforms of the 1990s had been in 
place for more than 5 years by the time this study was conducted. Organisations to be 
selected for the study must have existed before the MBS was introduced. Considering this, a 
total of 131 organisations were selected for this study. They comprise of 24 Ministries, 72 
Departments and 35 Statutory Bodies.   
A questionnaire was issued to the named Chief Secretary for each Ministry, Director 
General for each Department and Chief Executives or General Manager for each Statutory 
Body. Recognising the risk of low response rate in developing countries particularly in 
government organisations, the questionnaire was personally sent and collected by the 
researcher to and from the organisations. Malaysian central government organisations are 
mainly concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and a neighbouring city, Putrajaya, except for 
organisations in distant places such as in different states where questionnaires were mailed 
out. 94 responses were received resulting in a usable response rate of 72%.  
An analysis was undertaken of the status of employment of the individuals named as 
having completed the questionnaire and the results of this are reported in Table 1. The 
seniority of the respondents gives strong support of our belief that the responses provide an 
authoritative source of information on the issues raised. The respondents were also asked to 
state the period of employment as civil servants and the responses revealed that over 90% 
had more than 15 years civil service experience. The average length of the service was 23 
years. Pendlebury and Karbhari (1997) argued that the seniority of respondents would 
indicate the stronger level of confidence about civil servants’ perceptions on the impact of 
public sector reforms. 
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[ Insert Table 1 here ] 
Our responses are dominated by civil servants who had experience of the provision of 
government services before and after the reform programmes being implemented. This 
fulfilled the assumption that those that filled in the questionnaire were holding the adequate 
experience to assess the changes that took place as a result of the reforms. 
A series of interviews were also conducted after analysis of questionnaire survey 
responses. Two types of interviewees were selected: top management and line managers on 
account of their ability to provide information on the changes they had experienced as a 
result of the financial and managerial reforms. Of the 36 officers interviewed (17 were from 
Departments, 14 from Statutory Bodies and 5 from Ministries), almost all (97%) had 15 
years experience or more as civil servants and their average length of service was about 24 
years.  The analysis of the interview survey was also conducted by taking into account New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS) perspective as it may provide better picture of what is 
happening in the Malaysian government organisations that were involved in the reform 
process.   
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The Overall Impact of the MBS on Measuring Output Based Performance Indicators 
The respondents were invited to indicate the level of improvement in the performance 
measurement activities that their organisations experienced with the implementation of the 
MBS on a scale ranging from 1(significantly worsen), 2 (worsen), 3 (no change), 4 
(moderate improve), to 5 (significantly improve). The analysis of the finding is reported in 
Table 2. The results of questionnaire survey revealed in table 2 shows an encouraging 
findings with majority of the respondents indicated that the MBS had improved these 
government organisations’ performance measurement systems and progressed towards more 
aligned with the New Public Management (NPM). In another analysis by organisational 
status, although it did not reveal any significant differences in responses, it highlighted a 
noteworthy trend. The proportion of respondents from the Statutory Bodies perceived 
improvement in these three factors took place with the implementation of the MBS was 
higher (but not significantly so) than proportion of respondents from the Ministries and 
Departments. This finding seems to suggest that the likelihood of PMS improvement to take 
place is higher in Statutory Bodies than in Ministries and Departments. This seems to 
suggest that organisations with greater financial and operational autonomy would experience 
better improvement of performance measurement system from the centrally organised reform 
initiative.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
As analysis on the interview surveys responses revealed a moderate support for the 
questionnaire findings that the MBS had improved the performance measurement practice in 
their organisations with only 55% of the interviewees affirmed the improvement. 
Commenting on the overall impact of the MBS on performance management, a planning 
director in one of the medium sized Statutory Bodies remarked: 
“With the MBS, every division prepares details of input and output performance targets 
for the performance agreement. They identify the outputs of their divisions. Then, they set 
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the targets. These are their responsibilities, managers of each division and state based on 
the allocation distributed to them.” 
The interview surveys highlighted that the improvement due to the requirement of 
performance measures in the Programme Agreement. Interestingly, the majority of 
interviewees (60%) revealed that the use of the MBS's targets was new to their organisations. 
Besides increasing the standardization of types of performance measures used across 
government organsiations, the MBS was considered as enhancing comprehensive 
performance measurement system that focuses on both financial and non financial measures. 
Thus, this would improve performance assessment capacity of the organisations.  The 
comment of a senior planning director in a medium sized Statutory Body encapsulates this 
development caused by the MBS particularly well: 
 “Although we had our performance targets for our main activities prior to the 
introduction of the MBS, the new budgeting system improved the practice by introducing 
additional targets that we need to achieve…. The MBS make the performance 
measurement more systematic as targets are more comprehensive encompassing quality, 
timeliness and costs.” 
Confirming similar benefits of the MBS on performance measurement, a deputy director of a 
medium sized Department pointed out that: 
“The fact that the MBS requires us to develop both financial and non-financial 
indicators, this has improved the way we measure our performance” 
The majority of managers recognised that the improved performance measurement entailed 
better management of resources to achieve the set targets.  One administrative and finance 
director in a small Statutory Body pointed out that improved performance measures help 
management to focus their decision-making in order to achieve these targets.  
Nevertheless, the improvement brought in by the MBS on performance measurements 
was not without glitch.  The interview revealed that some managers provided excuses as 
though they should be absolved from these performance requirements.  Although this study 
was not specifically undertaken to measure loose coupling in accounting practice, resistance 
to change amongst managers with their excuses did somehow reflect this scenario. This 
provided further challenge to develop relevant performance indicators for managerial 
purposes.  This opposition is captured in the following comment from one top management 
officer: 
“We don’t feel the necessity to make these measurements. For me, as long as there is 
no public outcry about our services, we are successful.  In addition, I find that our 
managers do not rely on these measures for their work. Our performance is good as 
long as we can spend within the allocation given.” 
Obviously, the implementation strategies should be revised to ensure greater acceptance of 
the reform initiative. Lack of acceptance by the managers would impede the development of 
the performance measurement. They would not be developed properly to ensure their 
efficacy. Highlighting the lack of usefulness of the performance indicators reported in the 
Programme Agreement for internal use, a senior planning director in a medium sized 
Statutory Body pointed out: 
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“Even though we are required to show our output indicators quantitatively, since we 
give them aggregated figures, they are not really any use to our managers. After all, 
for our decision-making, we don’t really depend on them… impact indicators… are 
heavily dependent on the perception of the managers concerned. . Thus, their impact 
on our operations is minimal…Nevertheless, we have to provide them to the 
Treasury, since we are required to.” 
The resistance of managers could also be attributed by the accountability gap of the civil 
servants to their stakeholders. It could be argued that if performance measures required for 
reporting purposes do not match with their accountability requirements, the targets are likely 
to be ignored.  
Another excuse to resist the MBS performance initiative was that the managers 
blaming the weaknesses in enforcing targets in Programme Agreement on the part of the 
Treasury. This had also adversely affected development of the performance measurement 
systems of government organisations. Although the managers were given the full discretion 
to select their performance measures, this was used as an excuse by them to blame the 
Treasury over lack of guidance on developing useful measures.   Several managers 
interviewed that they expected a greater role of the Treasury in terms of advising and 
monitoring the performance measures and targets. Explaining this, a planning director in one 
of the medium sized Statutory Bodies pointed out: 
“Every time we prepare the performance and exception reports… the 
monitoring is not enforced at the Treasury level. We are not properly advised 
about whether what we measured is right or wrong.” 
Interviewees revealed that the weak enforcement by the Treasury was also due to the 
fact that their officials were not well versed in the details of operation in service delivery 
organisations. This had led top management in spending organisations to continuously use 
quantity targets that already existed even before the MBS. This result was consistent with the 
finding by Hyndman and Anderson (1997, p. 159) that without formal guidance, the 
managers relied heavily on examples that had been used in previous years, and there was 
little, if any, evaluation of their likely impact on management. This finding also appears that 
with resistance to change attitude of managers, the performance targets of the Programme 
Agreements are developed primarily for compliance, rather than for managerial use to 
improve performance.    Apparently, the pressure put by the Treasury with this performance 
requirements only led to superficial change.  
Resistance to change could also indicate the extent of changes that the Treasury could 
influence in government organisations. Revealing the weak role of the Treasury as one of the 
stakeholders, resistance to change may also mean that it is problematic for the Treasury to 
introduce a new form of accountability. Any change of accountability structure should have 
been done through other avenues such as either via legislative arm of the government or via 
head of the executive power, the Prime Minister. Another, as to induce the needs of results 
based measures amongst managers, this initiative should have been complimented with other 
quasi-market based reforms as to increase competitive environment in government 
organisations, thus for managers to focus on results based measures become  more natural.  
As the categories of performance measures were imposed on them rather than were 
based on the managerial needs, these indicators were developed for compliance purposes.  
The fact that the Treasury little involvement in the enforcement of the achieving the targets, 
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this provides the room for the managers to sideline the importance of these indicators.   
Nevertheless, the actions of the Treasury were justified because when they introduce this 
initiative was to provide the opportunity for government organisations to be more systematic 
in their performance assessment of their activities. But, the fact that it was not enforced and 
did not link to the managers’ incentives packages might severely undermine the reforms. 
Despite of these limitations, some organisations did take advantage on the initiative as part 
of the organisational learning process. 
Beside managers' resistance to change, the difficulty to measure outputs and results 
was also an obstacle for the organisations to capitalise the opportunity from the reform. To 
overcome this difficulty, government organisations sought to use processes based indicators.  
These targets were used for operations as well as for the agreement with the Treasury. In one 
medium sized Statutory Body, since not all of its activities had quantifiable outputs, it used 
processes based performance targets such as number of inspections per year, number of 
exhibitions per year, number of participants and number of talks per year.   
 
 
Stakeholders role in the Development of Performance Indicators 
Second part of this study addresses the issue of development of performance measures 
should match with the needs of stakeholders. This was addressed by asking the respondents 
on parties consulted to select key performance indicators to be used in their organisations, 
and the level of importance attached to different types of performance indicators.  
As highlighted in the literature, effective performance measurement system should take 
into account multidimensional features of performance indicators, because generally 
government organisations serve multiple stakeholders. In particular, to develop a complete 
set of performance indicators, all views from the stakeholders of the organisations must be 
taken into account, and this includes line managers, top management, the Parent Ministry, 
the Treasury and particularly the customers or the beneficiaries of the organisations.  
Therefore, the respondents were asked to indicate which parties they consulted in developing 
performance indicators in their organisations. The analysis of the result, including analysis 
by organisational status, operating environment and size is reported in Table 3. 
[Insert table 3 here] 
Table 3 displays that 70% of the respondents indicated that their organisations 
consulted both top management and line managers when deciding the type of performance 
indicators to be used. But, less than 30% of the respondents indicated that their organisations 
consulted the Parent Ministries, and the Treasury.  This seems to indicate the monopoly 
position of government organisations in providing public services. The minimal role of the 
Treasury and the Parent Ministries on the selection of the type of performance indicators to 
be used indicates the high level of autonomy of the government organisations in this matter. 
Even though the Programme Agreement of the MBS with the Treasury requires spending 
organisations to set the targets of the required groups of performance indicators, these 
requirements are very broad and ambiguous, which gives virtually absolute freedom to the 
spending organisations to decide what indicators to use.  
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A fairly discouraging finding was related to the role of the customers in the selections 
of performance measures. Only 21% of the respondents indicated that the views of their 
customers were taken into account.   Apparently, with these findings, the awareness to 
improve service delivery with customer focus was not fully developed in many government 
organisations.   The views from customers are very important to give an accurate insight into 
the quality of the services provided by the organisations. In short, the above findings seem to 
suggest that the top management of the related organisations had failed to take advantage of 
the freedom to develop an effective performance measurement system as the failure to 
consult customers’ views is recognised as leading to a deficient performance measurement 
system. Performance measurement systems that neglect the views of service users tend to 
contain few measures of relevance to management needs for effective service deliveries 
(McKevitt and Lawton, 1996, p. 53). These findings also consistent with the view of New 
Institutional Sociology theorists  about that the main concern of the top management of the 
organisations in developing performance indicators is to comply with the Treasury’s rules as 
a way to gain legitimacy of activities (coercive isomorphism) (Scapens, 2006) and 
requirements rather than to develop a system for greater performance.  
Use and Importance of Financial and Non Financial Performance Measures   
This study also aims to explore the use and  level of importance that managers attached 
to broad types of performance indicators that was in the MBS’s programme agreement. This 
study was motivated by the consistent evidence found in the literature that civil servants 
attached different degrees of importance to different types of performance indicators, and 
this was significantly influenced by who were dominant stakeholders in their views (Mc 
Kevitt and Lawton, 1996; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Hyndman and Eden, 2001). In the 
analysis, these indicators are classified into two main categories: financial indicators and 
non-financial indicators. The ‘financial indicators’ category includes unit cost of output type 
(i.e cost per identity card (IC)), cost reduction type (to achieve 5% savings in operational 
costs), and profitability type (i.e Return on Capital Employed). The ‘non-financial indicators’ 
category includes quality of output type (i.e Number of Customer Complaints and 
Timeliness of Services) and quantity of output type (i.e Average number of IC per worker 
each day).   Cost reduction and profitability type were asked simply due to the fact that cost 
savings as part of the MBS initiative also to test on overall regime to facilitate financial 
independence amongst government organisations.  
[Insert table 4 here] 
Table 4 displays few interesting finding with regard to use of performance indicators. 
Particularly, it shows that non-financial indicators were more widely used than financial 
indicators. Specifically, the overall analysis column in Table 4 reveals that the proportion of 
respondents indicating the use of quality (85%) and quantity (78%) of output type was higher 
than the proportion of respondents indicating the use of unit cost per output (63%) type in 
their organisations. This means that some organisations (15%) were able to measure output, 
but did not use unit cost of output type as part of the overall performance measures. This 
may reflect the lack of concern of these organisations to provide output cost information for 
greater performance purposes, particularly related to efficiency and Value for Money 
awareness. One bright side, this finding confirms our expectation that with the MBS, the 
government organisations should place customers related performance indicators more than 
others,  weak emphasis in efficiency may undermine efforts to improve better use of public 
resources. Without unit cost of output information, cost efficiency assessment and 
benchmarking would be difficult. 
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When the overall analysis between responses from Departments, Ministries and 
Statutory Bodies regarding the use of non-financial indicators against financial indicators 
was undertaken, it provided consistent clues regarding the different emphasis given by the 
government organisations across organisational status over financial and non-financial 
indicators. Although Table 4 revealed that the significant different of responses for 
profitability types (p<.00) and quantity of outputs (p<.04) with respondents from Statutory 
Bodies scored significantly higher in probability indicators, but significantly lower in output 
indicators, this did not suggest that the problem of lack of emphasis on efficiency and value 
for money was more prevalent in Ministries and Departments than in the Statutory Bodies. 
More use of profitability indicators by the statutory bodies was because sixty-eight per cents 
of the respondents from Statutory Bodies indicated that their organisations generated income, 
while only 22% of the respondents from Departments gave this response. As far as the 
quantity of output type is concerned, Table 4 shows the significantly lower use of this 
indicator by the statutory bodies because greater use of profitability indicators made quantity 
of output indicators irrelevant.  
While analysis on the use of performance indicators provides some insights on the 
relevance of these indicators in government organisations, analysis on the level of 
importance that managers attached to these indicators would further strengthen the validity 
of the findings on the use of these indicators. Interestingly, the overall finding of the 
responses as displayed in Table 5 revealed a comparable pattern as it was in the analysis of 
the overall use of these indicators that non-financial indicators were given more priority over 
efficiency and profitability indicators. It could be seen that quality type and quantity type 
indicators were ranked first and second in mean scores (4.15 and 4.06, respectively).  This 
confirms the findings of the use of these indicators. The analysis by organisational status was 
also consistent with similar analysis in the use of indicators, thus not reported further. 
Nevertheless, lack of pervasive use efficiency indicators across government organisations as 
revealed above seems to suggest that greater financial autonomy that was promoted by the 
MBS did not necessarily make government organisations to consider efficiency 
consideration more seriously.  
[Insert table 5 here] 
The findings of main questionnaire survey disclosed a notable difference between the 
use of financial and non-financial indicators, with non-financial indicators being more 
important than financial indicators. In light of these findings, the interview survey further 
explored the issue. Despite the fact that the government attempted to increase value for 
money awareness amongst managers, the interview survey revealed that efficiency 
considerations were not yet paramount at government organisational level.  The use of cost 
information for efficiency consideration is significantly limited, either due to the absence of 
the information, the information not being designed for managers’ use or managers simply 
being content to use other sources of information to serve the same purpose. The vast 
majority of government organisations interviewed used expenditure reports and complied 
with the Treasury’s requirements to control costs, with the general attitude being to spend as 
close as possible to the allocation provided. The interview also revealed that the imbalance 
between financial and non financial indicators was possibly contributed by the fact that there 
was a demarcation between operational activities and financial management. In other words, 
managers are held accountable for operational performance as reflected with greater 
emphasis on operational targets, but are not held accountable for the relationship between 
operational performance and uses of financial allocations. These made financial indicators 
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were less emphasised as far as operational activities were undertaken within budget 
allocation.  This also shows that it was not easy for the new performance measures to get 
acceptance amongst the managers. They prefer to keep the existing culture of relying mainly 
on the expenditure report in place. The new results based performance targets may improve 
transparency and thus change their level of accountability.  This apparently made their works 
more difficult.  
Although the interview survey revealed that cost reduction type indicators are not 
specifically in use, cost control activities of government organisations tend to work within 
the framework of ‘100% utilisation of the given allocation’. This is because both under-
spending and over-spending from the budget allocation are considered unfavourable.  Cost 
reduction activities relating to expenditure control, as disclosed in the interviews, include 
sending out continous reminders and limited delegation of financial autonomy to 
responsibility centre managers to ensure that they spend within the allocated budget. Spend 
within budget was also undertaken with the motivation than non-spending of allocation 
would lead to future budget reduction. A senior manager is the largest size department 
pointed out on  this: 
“But now, if we don’t spend, we are seen as incapable to plan because what we being 
allocated based on what we submitted to the Treasury.” 
Regarding profitability measures, the interview survey revealed interesting findings. In 
one case, a Department used profitability indicators as part of their preparation for 
privatisation process.  Profitability indicator was used to determine the expected future cash 
flows as well as for pricing of service purposes for commercial customers.  One of the 
Statutory Bodies used profitability targets because one of its main activities was trading. 
Profitability targets, however, were not used to maximise profits, but rather as a control to 
ensure that sales were adequate to cover the operating costs. The main reason was that the 
organisation needed to purchase its trading stocks from the target groups at reasonable costs 
while selling at prevailing market prices.  The main function of the activity was to assist the 
target groups in income generation activities. Another Statutory Body used profitability 
targets as one of the mechanisms to control its subsidiary companies.  
The majority of government organisations that did not use profitability targets can be 
categorised into two groups. The first is comprised of non-income generating organisations. 
In this group, profitability indicators are not applicable. The other group generated income.  
Although organisations in this group generated income because they charged fees for their 
services, profitability targets were not used for three main reasons.  First, the prices were not 
controllable, as they were fixed by the Cabinet. Second, the services provided by the 
organisations were heavily subsidised by the government, as a means by which to discharge 
its social responsibilities. Third, profitability was never a consideration in their decision-
making, as their main source of finance was from the Treasury.   
Interestingly, interview survey also highlights the expectations of the various managers 
about the outcome measures as they should be the most important performance indicators of 
the MBS. However, they revealed that it was difficult to measure the outcomes of activities. 
Outcomes are not immediately visible within a budget year. The measurement of outcomes 
from the activities should be performed to measure the extent to which the activities 
conducted can address the problems that these organisations are set up to address; this is 
their main performance issue.  Commenting on the nature of performance measures that 
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should be used in his/her organisation, a senior manager in one of the largest Statutory 
Bodies pointed out: 
“We have activities with a substantial amount of the budget, but the effect of the 
spending is not clear in the short term. We cannot quantify the outcomes in the short term. 
For instance, we ran a promotional campaign on awareness for 10 years. The impact was 
not immediately visible. Then, there was a major shift of preference of consumers from 
foreign products to local products. We had an impact on the industry. The outcome was 
not on our income, but on our stakeholders and target groups.” 
Interviews also discovered the existing accountability requirements of civil servants to 
focus on achieving quantity targets made the shift of responsibility to achieving outcomes 
least likely. Managers in government organisations acting in monopoly environments seem 
to be satisfied with their process and output targets but not outcomes.  Output and process 
quantity performance measurement does not necessarily guarantee the desired outcomes, 
particularly when the outcomes are the cumulative results of activities from different 
government organisations.  
For instance, the researcher had the opportunity to interview representatives from one 
Department and three Statutory Bodies, which shared one single Parent Ministry and were 
mainly solving a similar problem in different target groups. The main desired outcome is 
improving the conditions of the target groups. Three of them disclosed problems in assessing 
the outcomes of their activities for the target groups. A line manager in one of these three 
organisations commented that the successful meeting of the output objective does not 
guarantee the desired changes in the conditions of the target groups. Only one of these 
organisations followed through to monitoring changes in the conditions of the target groups.  
Some of the main problems are the limited scope of the output to address the problems, lack 
of co-ordination between organisations within the same Parent Ministry operating in the 
same jurisdiction and not enough competent workers. These issues had not received the 
attention of the top management of these organisations because the overall quantity 
performance targets had been the focus. This finding discloses the danger of placing 
emphasis on quantity output indicators, while ignoring the overall objectives of the activities 
– reflected as outcomes.  Commenting on the accountability gap between output quantity 
targets and outcomes, a responsibility centre manager of a medium sized Statutory Body 
remarked: 
“Based on the performance being measured, we are good enough. For people (top 
management) in the main office, as long as we achieve the output target assigned to us, 
that is enough. But, the impact of those activities on our customers is questionable.  The 
impacts are there but not comprehensive. Apparently, our objective is concentrated on 
achieving the output targets, but not on the overall improvement in the conditions of our 
customers. Overall, their conditions remain the same after 25 years I have been in the 
service.” 
This also revealed the need that the overall review of government organisations’ activities 
should be subject to independent assessment to ensure their appropriateness and adequacy to 
properly serve the target groups that these organisations set out to serve. In short, a shift from 
input/process accountability to output accountability is itself a major reform, as recognised in 
the NPM.  However, this shift is apparently not sufficient to ensure proper utilisation of 
public funds in service deliveries to the public, as reflected by the concerns of some 
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managers who, when interviewed, commented on the importance of assessing the outcomes 
of their organisations’ activities.  
The attempt to make civil servants accountable for outputs and outcomes faced 
accountability structural problem as analysed in impact of MBS on output based 
accountability. Apparently, extending the accountability structure of the civil servants from 
process/output accountability to outcomes accountability need substantial government 
expenditure as to put the proper accountability infrastructure into places.  The needs to hire 
competent civil servants for the purpose (both internal evaluation as well as attestation of 
independent body), allocation to conduct the study, information system across the civil 
services to share the information. All these require extra workloads and burdens to the civil 
services. Above all, the motivation of the senior civil services to put this system into place 
might not be favourable, as the system would expose their weakness in managing the public 
funds further.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The attempt by the Malaysian government through the performance measures of the 
MBS is considered as significant to put forward the reforms in the government to be in line 
with reforms in the developed nations that emphasised results based accountability of civil 
service managers.  Traditionally, the civil service organisations relied on input and process 
based performance indicators. The NPM’s proponents argued that output based indicators 
would lead to better management of public funds.   
The purpose of this study was mainly twofold. Firstly, this study attempts to find 
evidence regarding the impact of the MBS, which is NPM’s like reform (devolved 
budgeting, customer focus and application of output based performance measures) on 
performance measurement practice in the Malaysian central government. Specifically, the 
study sought the perceptions of senior managers on how they perceived the MBS had change 
the way their organisations measure their performance.  Majority of the respondents from 
both questionnaire and interview surveys perceived that the MBS had improved performance 
measurement in their organisations. Interestingly, they recognised that there was a shift from 
process and input based indicators to output based performance targets.  Nevertheless, 
further analysis of the interview survey findings reflects that the improvement was limited.  
Concerns of the managers on the usefulness of the indicators reflect their tendency to comply 
with the Treasury’s requirements than for managerial purposes.  Lack of enforcement on the 
part of the Treasury on these performance indicators in their budget review and control 
further worsen the development of the output based performance indicators.  Also, analysis 
about the parties consulted to develop the key performance indicators also revealed that lack 
of engagement of the customers in the process. Although the MBS was supposed to 
emphasis on customers, weakness to identify customer needs and wants would somehow 
undermine the quality of indicators developed  
Secondly, this study also attempts to provide evidence regarding the use and 
importance of each type of performance indicators that civil service managers attached. 
Based on findings of the prior studies that asserted performance indicators that were 
emphasised by dominant stakeholders of government organisations would make the 
performance indicators become important in the eyes of top management of the government 
organisations.  Consistent with the findings of the use of the performance measures, non-
financial indicators were considered more important than financial indicators in majority of 
organisations participated in the study.  This finding could be a good news that with the 
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MBS, government organisations were concerned on quality of their services. As the findings 
of the interview survey highlighted the importance of budget expenditure report, unit cost 
information was considered as less relevant as long as the government organisations could 
work within the budget allocation. Furthermore, the study revealed that the main financial 
performance measure was to exhaust the budget allocation. Although, expenditure target of 
the MBS was meant to limit the spending and reducing gaming, the culture of year end 
spending spree remains as to avoid future cut of allocations. More recently, government 
organisations were required to develop and set targets for their Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) (PMD, 2005).  Nevertheless, without the structural changes that this study put 
forward, any new initiative would be more of a show that change in substance. Nevertheless, 
as pointed by Scapens (2006) that it possible in management accounting change initiated by 
central government body would later became the catalyst for the managers in government 
organisations to adopt the technique for managerial purposes. 
In spite of the following limitations, a considerable effort was undertaken in the study 
to ensure that the original aims and objectives of the study were met and the research 
objectives were answered. Firstly, this study was confined to the impact of the MBS on 
performance measurement in central government organisations. Thus, no reference is made 
to the impact of the MBS on other public sector components such as state government, local 
government, hospitals, and public schools and universities. Secondly, there are obvious 
limitations in asking senior managers of government organisations about improved 
effectiveness, autonomy and management systems.  Any deficiencies admitted might be 
perceived as deficiencies in their management abilities.   This also may produce bias in their 
perceptions.  Also, the overall response rate to the questionnaire survey was only seventy-
two per cent. Although the response rate was considered high, based on common practice in 
questionnaire surveys, the twenty-eight per cent non-response rate may indicate inherent 
systematic bias. However, the fact that triangulation of data was undertaken through 
interview surveys to minimise bias generated by research respondents.  
There are three ways in which the research as a whole could be extended. First, the 
perceptions and experiences of managers at the state and local government levels regarding 
the impact of the MBS on performance measurement in their organisations could be 
incorporated. This could be undertaken by distributing the questionnaire used in this study to 
these managers.  Second, further research should ascertain to incorporate the perceptions and 
experience of officers from the Treasury and the Accountant General’s Department who 
were directly involved in advising and monitoring the implementation of the MBS.  Also of 
benefit would be a case study approach that would attempt to study in depth the changes in 
performance measurement practice that have taken place since the introduction of the new 
system. In-depth comparative research could be undertaken by studying cases of 
organisations that had adverse experiences and those that had positive experience of the 
reforms.  
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Table 1: Status of Respondents by category of employment. 
 
Departments Statutory Bodies Ministries Total 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Director General/ Chief 
Executives/Secretary General 10 18 1 4 2 14 13 14 
Deputy Director General 9 16 3 12 4 29 16 17 
Admin & Finance Directors 22 40 8 32 7 50 37 39 
Director Of Corporate/ Planning 6 11 4 16 1 7 10 11 
Senior General Managers 8 15 9 - - - 18 19 
Total 55 100 25 100 14 100 94 100
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Table 3: Overall Analysis showing the stakeholders consulted to select 
types of performance indicators used  
 
Parties consulted: 
Overall analysis 
(n=94) 
 No. % 
The Line Managers 66 70 
Top Management 66 70 
The Parent Ministry  27 29 
The Treasury 22 23 
The Customers 20 21 
No Party consulted 1 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Overall Impact of the Modified Budgeting System on the Performance Measurement of Malaysian 
Government Organisations (n=91)
Impact of the Modified Budgeting System on: 
No Change Moderate Improve 
Significantly 
Improve  OVERALL 
No % No % No % MEAN RANK 
Output based performance measurement 16 18 63 69 12 13 3.96 1 
linkage between inputs and outputs 21 23 54 60 15 17 3.93 2 
Developing own output measures 22 24 55 61 13 14 3.90 3 
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 Table 4: Analysis showing the performance indicators used  
 
Types of Performance
Indicators: 
Overall analysis
(n=94) 
Organisational Status 
(see Note 1) 
Dept. SB Min Sig 
Financial Indicators: No. % % % %  
Unit cost of output type 59 63 67 52 64 - 
Cost Reduction type 50 53 46 64 64 - 
Profitability type 25 27 18 52 14 *p=.00 
Non-Financial Indicators:       
Quality of output type 80 85 86 88 78 - 
Quantity of output type 73 78 86 60 79 *p=.04 
Note 1: Where: (Dept)=Departments; (SB)= Statutory Bodies and (Min)= Ministries 
* indicates distribution of responses between the three categories is significantly different (using the
Kruskal Wallis test). 
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Table 5: Overall Analysis showing the Importance Attached by Respondents to Types of Performance Indicators Used 
Types of Performance Indicators: Very Unimportant / Not Important  Neutral 
Important / Very 
Important OVERALL 
Financial Indicators: No % No % No % MEAN RANK 
Unit cost per output type (n=77) 7 9 18 23 52 68 3.79 3 
Cost Reduction type (n=71) 11 16 19 27 41 57 3.51 4 
Profitability type (n=59) 22 38 16 27 21 35 2.90 5 
Non-Financial Indicators:         
Quality of output type (n=86) 3 3 8 9 75 88 4.15 1 
Quantity of output type (n=82) 4 5 11 13 67 82 4.06 2 
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